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„But if thoughts corrupt language, language can also corrupt thought.“
– George Orwell, Politics and the English language (Horizon, 1946)
Eastern Europe possesses enormous resources of bad faith. This surfeit, generated
by patterns of underdevelopment, is problematic for the creation and even more
for the ‘restoration’ of rule of law and constitutionalism. Both concepts shorthand
evolutions and equilibriums that are mind-bendingly sophisticated. Without the
internalization of the collective capacity to make the fine distinctions underlying
the notions, the words as such are prone to oversimplification and ensuing
ideological capture.1)See, generally, on the open-endedness of the abstract RoL
concept, Martin Loughlin, The Rule of Law in European Jurisprudence, https://
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-DEM(2009)006-
e The contextual odds are stacked against peripheral reform radicalism, even
(perhaps particularly) under the banner of the noblest ideals.
I will, in what follows, seek to answer the overarching question of this symposium,
starting from a cautionary Romanian rule of law (RoL) reform tale. Other things
being equal, its lessons may be extrapolated to the specific case of hopefully
post-Orbánite Hungary. Even though macroeconomic indicators are narrowing
quickly (Bucharest has for instance surpassed Budapest in terms of GDP per
capita),2)https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/statistics-illustrated Romania
lagged traditionally behind in East-Central Europe. This was true in the interwar
period, when the Romanian Kingdom exported unprocessed wheat, usually at
a loss, whereas Hungary possessed the second-largest flour production mills
in the world (after Minneapolis).3)Ivan Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and
Eastern Europe Before World War II (Berkeley: UC Press, 1998). At p. 19. It still
remained true almost a century later, during the eastward enlargement, when
Romania and Bulgaria were passed over for ‘Big Bang’ promotion; the two Balkan
countries joined the EU in 2007 with sui-generis post-accession strings attached.
Nonetheless, caveat aside, most of Central and Eastern Europe shares to various
degrees resilient path-dependencies deriving from the pre-communist, agrarian
nature of its societies. Additional commonalities were created by (post)communist
determinations. More apposite to the current topic of discussion, my country has
generated repeated backsliding events (in 2012 and again in 2016-2019); as a
sizable crisis-prone new Member State, it was analogized first to Hungary and more
recently to Poland.
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‘Quick Fix’ Solutions and the Rule of Law:
Anticorruption in Romania
In Romania, the rule of law has been used over the past 20 years to convey
ideological representations about the virtues of repressive anticorruption.
Anticorruption is an EU conditionality, whose local fulfilment was concretized in the
constitutional entrenchment in 2003 of a highly autonomous judicial system and, in
2002/2005, in the creation and then strengthening of an autonomous anticorruption
prosecutor’s office within it, the DNA (Direc#ia Na#ional# Anticorup#ie).4)Created
in 2002 in a weak form, as Parchetul Na#ional Anticorup#ie, it was restructured as
a self-contained anticorruption watchdog, under the name National Anticorruption
Department, in 2005 (by EGO 134/2005) and renamed as Directorate in 2006.
Formally a subdivision of the General Prosecutor’s Office, the DNA is in functional
reality fully autonomous, operating as an independent accountability agency. See
Elena-Simina T#n#sescu, “The Impact of National Accountability Agencies on the
EU”, in B. Iancu and E.S. T#n#sescu eds., Governance and Constitutionalism:
Law, Politics and Institutional Neutrality (London: Routledge, 2018), at pp. 85-96.
The General Prosecutor of the General Prosecutor’s Office Attached to the High
Court is formally the superior, in order to deflect a constitutionality limitation,
namely, exclusive prosecutorial competence of this office over the indictment of
deputies and senators, under Art. 72 (2) (Decision of the Constitutional Court No.
235/5 May 2005). In reality, the General Prosecutor has no leverage over the
Chief Prosecutor of the DNA. For a while, there was universal enthusiasm for the
institutional potential of the fight against graft to rid society of political evils. The
DNA produced indictments with colourful nicknames, indictments resulted especially
after 2012 in a string of resounding high-level convictions, prosecutors were lionized
and immortalized in the high-brow press. Meanwhile, the perp-walks of disgraced
notables generated syncopated catharses, while periodic leaks anticipated the trials
in the court of public opinion. We were, as Commission CVM monitoring reports
regularly noted, in the process of building the rule of law-based state by ‘robust’
anticorruption, on the basis of the ‘independence of the judicial system in its entirety.’
These reforms, backed by the premise of collective punitive transfiguration as rule
of law, happened however in a context which was from the onset highly receptive
to the notions of retribution, jails, handcuffs, and prosecutors and not so much
to other elective affinities (rule of law, parliaments, constitutions, procedures,
and judges). The centre-right president who spearheaded anticorruption, Traian
B#sescu (2004-2014), famously campaigned and won in 2004 by promising ‘wooden
spikes (#epe) in Victoria Square’, embossing on the EU-driven anticorruption
conditionalities the celebrated effigy of Vlad the Impaler (1428-31, 1476-77). This
arguably backward domestic ethos doubles back on specific social and economic
cleavages. Neat urban-rural divides, a mark of past agrarian underdevelopment,
have been retrenched by the EU accession, whose benefits are severely skewed
against the rural and small-urban areas and strongly in favour of the bigger
cities. In Bucharest, the poverty rate is now, according to the National Statistics
Institute, 15 times lower than in the North East region (the percentages are 2,4%
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and 35,6%, respectively).5)https://insse.ro/cms/sites/default/files/field/publicatii/
dimensiuni_ale_incluziunii_sociale_in_romania_2020.pdf Patterns of uneven
development between the late neo-feudal, Balkan Old Kingdom and the differently
stratified former Austro-Hungarian provinces hearken back to the nineteenth
century and the interwar. Bigger cities vote disproportionally centre-right throughout
the country, as do, overall, the former Austro-Hungarian provinces. The sizable
Romanian diaspora votes overwhelmingly right.
Anticorruption (‘the rule of law’) steadily developed into a centre-right discourse,
fused with all manner of anti-redistributive narratives and embellished by
mock-civilizational glosses. Eventually, all political problems were translated in
anticorruption terms, driving pre-existing cleavages to extremes and leaving no
legitimate space for classical ideologies, negotiation, and compromise (in short,
for recognizable party politics). The social democrats were at the receiving end
of anticorruption prosecutions and retaliated in kind by adopting, in 2017, an
emergency ordinance (EGO 13/2017), published well towards the break of dawn,
that would have redefined the crime of abuse of office and rescued the party
president from a pending indictment. The latter was accused, and eventually
convicted, for colluding with the head of the Child Protection Agency of Teleorman
County, to fictitiously hire two women who worked in reality for the local party
branch. Midnight emergency ordinances that inure to the benefit of party bosses
have little to do with a thicker, traditionally Western account of the rule of law. But
many episodes of high-profile Romanian anticorruption leave much to be desired
as well, from the indictment of a former Prosecutor General accused in essence of
commuting to Bucharest with an escort to that of an attorney convicted for having
lawfully promoted the interests of his clients ‘with methods specific to juridical
argumentation.’ These two DNA indictments (and many similar others) resulted
eventually in acquittals. In the specific recent case of the attorney, Mr. Ro#u, he was
first acquitted of all charges of organized crime and complicity to abuse of office by
the Bra#ov Court of Appeals, then convicted on appeal by a panel of the High Court,
and lastly –November 2021– acquitted of all charges by another High Court panel,
in the solution of an extraordinary cassation appeal, after having spent 11 months in
jail.
Acquittals have multiplied recently and have something to do with the last episode
of the Romanian anticorruption saga, which revolves around the deferred abolition
of a special prosecutorial body created by the PSD-dominated majority in 2018,
the Section for the Investigation of Offences Committed within the Judiciary
(SIOJ). All files concerning magistrates were transferred to this section. The
main argument behind the creation of the entity was that the DNA had in the
past kept files on judges and prosecutors open for years on end, in order to
intimidate them — particularly higher-ranking judges and Council members
— and thus secure favourable solutions in high-profile cases. According to a
2018 Judicial Inspection report, there are quite a few statistical indicators which,
at least prima facie, substantiate the fear.6)Approved by Superior Council of
Magistracy, Plenum Decision 225/15 October 2019, at http://old.csm1909.ro/csm/
linkuri/08_01_2020__97031_ro.pdf
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In 2020, a centre-right coalition came to power, on an anticorruption agenda which
had defined the EP and presidential elections of 2019 and the subsequent national
parliamentary elections of 2020. The minor member of this coalition, the Union
Save Romania (USR), was created explicitly on an anticorruption platform. Its
electoral base draws primarily on the support of big-urban middle classes. This
faction insisted on scrapping the special section, as an impediment to reviving the
‘European rule of law’ (meaning, the return to full-steam anticorruption). Meanwhile
however, senior judges and most mainstream parties favour a compromise
alternative solution, by which some guarantee of DNA impartiality would be
guaranteed in a similar format. So do now most mainstream politicians, including
former rule of law champion, President Iohannis. In the end, the USR minister of
justice, who insisted on pushing forward with the removal of the new body, was
sacked with short ceremony and presidential imprimatur, the anticorruption coalition
was dismantled, and a new ‘grand coalition’ government was formed including the
mainstream left, the PSD (successfully labelled by the right for many years as the
epitome of corrupt politics), the mainstream centre-right, the National Liberal Party
(PNL, a longstanding bastion of rhetorical anticorruption), and the Hungarian minority
party, UDMR/RMDSZ (pragmatic kingmaker of many coalitions).
The volte-face was perceived by the finer anti-corruption society and by the last
remaining bastion of ‘robust’ fight against graft, the USR, as a betrayal of the
common cause by centre-right President Iohannis and his National Liberal Party
and, in a way, it was. But the dominant RoL discourse had to be rolled back or at
least toned down, since there is only so much “European rule of law” extravaganza
the poor periphery can take. One cannot project indefinitely upon a country of 19
million, in which almost one third of the households lack indoor plumbing,7)https://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20191119-1 a vision of
the rule of law which encapsulates ideological proclivities (affluent-urban latter-day
Thatcherism, ornamented with handcuff fantasies and disjointed mock-progressive
fads) shared at most by 10-11% of the electorate. The newest realignment, to be
sure, does not signify a return to “rule of law” either, simply a return to old-style
patrimonial politics.
Peripheral RoL Instrumentalism and EU
Vulnerabilities
Since the predicate policy solution for the consolidation of a peculiar understanding
of the rule of law was an EU conditionality, giving effect to more general trends
towards anticorruption as modernization/stabilization panacea in peripheral
jurisdictions, the above is obviously not only a Romanian story. Indeed, the only
reason why the anticorruption discourse and associated practices did not peter
out sooner (as in Brazil recently, as in Italy in the 90s) has been the geopolitical
lack of vision and alternative solutions at the level of the EU and Council of Europe
bodies. Too much was invested in the anticorruption discourse as a reform panacea
(for the Western Balkans, for Ukraine, for Moldova) and Romanian complexity/
ambivalence could not be allowed to simply stand in the way. In practical effect,
the EU Commission has ignored for a decade and a half the nebulous sides
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of Romanian anticorruption. The Union executive kept the CVM, a mechanism
initially scheduled to be closed a decade ago, open until now. More recently,
it did not however issue reports for years on end, in spite of its express legal
mandate to do so.8)According to Art 2 of Decision 2006/928/EC, after June 2007
„the Commission will report again thereafter as and when required and at least
every six months.” In some years two reports were issued, in some years one and
between October 2019 and June 2021 none. https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/
justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/assistance-bulgaria-
and-romania-under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania_en#year2018
Yet the Commission bears only part of the blame for this failure, which is merely a
reflection of the structural overtaxing of its capabilities. Bureaucracies, no matter
how superbly adequate to certain tasks (high-end statistics, cross-border competition
law enforcement, and the like), cannot constitutionalize-civilize-modernize a quarter
of a continent overnight. For their part, Eastern European elites of various kinds
have perhaps not internalized the normative nuts and bolts of Western rule of
law dialectics but adjusted remarkably well to the superficial jargon of rule of law
ideologies, utilizing EU structural vulnerabilities and general Western needs to
reduce peripheral complexities,9)https://www.nzz.ch/international/rumaeniens-
praesident-iohannis-ist-kein-reformer-ld.1656683 usually by recourse to expedited
heuristics. For instance, the anticorruption camp in Romania deftly exploited the
geopolitical stakes, namely, the false analogy between the Romanian SIOJ (a
poorly thought solution to a genuine problem) and the (truly objectionable) Polish
Special Chamber. The Court of Justice, thus prodded and trapped at any rate in
its own Poland-centred proxy hermeneutics, held that the CVM has superordinate
status over the national constitution, implying that such effect accrues also to the
–often inexistent– soft law monitoring reports.10)Judgment of the Court (Grand
Chamber) In Joined Cases C#83/19, C#127/19, C#195/19, C#291/19, C#355/19
and C#397/19 (18 May 2021), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
docid=241381&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=4421197
In the EU, this configuration was to a certain extent a foregone conclusion, and will
remain thus for the foreseeable future, until either a full step ahead towards federal
unity or a half-step back from the ‘tyranny of values’ is taken. The Union capacity to
spread prosperity, albeit unevenly distributed, is nothing short of wondrous. Romania
itself was macroeconomically lifted from its 90s third-world status to the cusp of
a high-income economy. But common market dynamics are matched only to a
superficial degree by the civilizational capabilities of the Union, which remain market-
driven (‘functionalist’)11)See Turkuler Isiksel, Europe’s Functional Constitution: A
Theory of Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Oxford: OUP, 2016). On post-Lisbon
emphasis on and implementation of values, Stephen Weatherill, Law and Values
in the European Union (NY: OUP, 2016). and inchoate. The story above shows
how an inadequate reform solution was embraced domestically and deflected from
its purpose. What started as a (simplistic EU-driven) solution became part of the
perennial Romanian problem whereby, in the longer run, Union institutions served
merely as echo chambers.
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Rule of Law Restoration in Hungary: Handle with
Care for Context
The specific context of Hungary presents, at least apparently, the Romanian
problem in reverse, namely, the transition from an authoritarian nationalist regime
to a pluralist, European, rule of law order. The Orbán government has over the
years done much that is reprehensible, from the public discourses, saturated with
Europhobe undertones and aggressive nativist rhetoric to specific actions, among
which the persecution of the Central European University stands out in obscenity.
Even so, the Stunde Null implications of the questions framing this fascinating
invitation to debate are somewhat unwarranted (intendedly/provocatively, given the
pre-eminence of the two conveners). Continuities of instrumentalism pre-existed,
albeit more low-key, the FIDESZ Machtergreifung12)Cf. Attila Vincze, “Talking
Past Each Other: On Common Misperceptions in the Rule of Law Debate”, in
Astrid Lorenz, Lisa H. Anders, eds., Illiberal Trends and Anti-EU Politics in East
Central Europe, Palgrave Macmillan (Springer Online), London/Heidelberg, 2020,
pp. 209-233, at https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-54674-8_9
and some normative continuities were identified even in the reviled 2011
Fundamental Law.13)Andra#s Jakab, Pa#l Sonnevend, Kontinuita#t mit Ma#ngeln:
Das neue ungarische Grundgesetz, Zao#RV 72 (2012), 79-102, at  https://
www.zaoerv.de/72_2012/72_2012_1_a_79_102.pdf More relevant still (also in
practical terms), the current majority, if it is to lose power, will be unseated by a
motley coalition counting a metamorphosed Jobbik among its heavyweights. At
the helm of this unseemly alliance sits a professedly conservative Catholic from
the Hungarian heartland. Should the transition from current constitutional politics
to a more pluralistic, open, liberal regime be able to take place, the questions that
should precede the pragmatics as to how the rule of law can be restored is what
the restoration could mean in the specific context of Hungary now and how its
preconditions could be ensured. In this latter respect, it would be helpful to separate
the illegitimate (xenophobic, Europhobic, perhaps anti-Semitic) reasons why the
current majority was so popular for such a long time from the more legitimate
claims or frustrations, which can be accommodated by a thicker notion of the
(sozialer?) Rechtsstaat in a civil, liberal-constitutional manner. In rule of law-creation
or restoration, starting from contextual preconditions is always more helpful than
upping the abstract conceptual-discursive ante.
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